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Abstract
Southeast Asia or Southeastern Asia, with more than six hundred million pop-
ulations, is home to millions of Buddhists, Muslims, Confucians, Protestants, 
Catholics, and now Pentecostals, as well as many followers of local religions and 
spiritual beliefs. Notwithstanding its great historical, political, cultural legacies, 
however, the region has long been neglected as a site for religious studies in the 
Western academia. Aiming at filling the gap in Asian and religious studies as 
well as exploring the richness of Southeast Asian cultures, this article discusses 
the dynamics, diversity, and complexity of Southeast Asian societies in their re-
sponse to the region’s richly political, cultural, and religious traditions spanning 
from pre-modern era to modern one. The article also examines the “integrative 
revolutions” that shaped and reshaped warfare, state organization and econom-
ics of Southeast Asia, particularly in the pre-European colonial era. In addition, 
the work discusses the wave of Islamization, particularly since the nineteenth 
century, as well as the upsurge of religious resurgence that shift the nature of 
religiosity and the formation of religious groupings in the area. The advent of 
Islam, with some interventions of political regimes, had been an important cause 
for the decline of Hindu-Buddhist traditions in some areas of Southeast Asia, 
especially Indonesia, the coming of Pentecostalism has challenged the well-estab-
lished mainstream Protestantism and Catholicism, especially in Indonesia and 
the Philippines.    
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PRE-MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
THE POWER OF HINDUISM-BUDDHISM
It is imperative to note that based on archeological sources, people living 
in the regions of today’s Southeast Asia1 who were skilful in “casting metals 
and making pottery” were as early as 3000 years BCE (Osborne 2002: 21), 
signifying that the history of Southeast Asia’s civilizations is as old as that 
of Egypt’s, Greece’s, India’s, and China’s. Although the region has prolonged 
historical records, however, it is not until the first centuries of AD that the 
region’s cultures and civilizations become visible. Known as the Southeast 
1 Southeast Asia is a sub-region of Asia consisting of the countries that are geo-
graphically south of China, east of India, west of New Guinea, and north of Australia. 
[  146  ]
AL ALBAB - Borneo Journal of Religious Studies (BJRS) Volume 2 Number 2 December 2013
Asia’s Golden Age, this classical era had been marked by the appearance of 
great cultural achievements crafted by the early actors of the Indic states. 
These remarkable accomplishments, achieved by the “Indic” courts that 
were scattered across Southeast Asia, were later followed or replaced by what 
the noted historian of Southeast Asia Anthony Reid (1988, 1995) has called 
the “Age of Commerce” typified by the dynamics of global trade involving 
foreigners of various professions such as, among others, merchants, teachers, 
gurus, Sufis, travelers, and priests coming from around the world: China, 
India, Persia, Bangladesh, Arab and the Middle East, Ceylon, and Madagascar, 
to name but a few (see also Lombard 1996).
The region of “pre-modern” Southeast Asia was divided into two main 
categories: mainland / inland and maritime, each of which has special 
characteristics in terms of its people, along with their cultures, divisions 
of labor, social living, organization, traditions, technologies, and system of 
beliefs. Later, as I will discuss below, such distinctive features of the mainland-
maritime influenced the forms and characteristics of the region’s traditional 
states or courts. Moreover, the mainland region, known as Indochina 
comprising Cambodia, Laos, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and Vietnam, was 
divided into two major areas, namely upland and lowland. Historian Milton 
Osborne (2002: 65; 2000: 53) calls it “hill-valley division.” People living on 
the upland territory have also different features from those who lived on 
the lowland. While peasant farmer was part of the dominant society of the 
lowland, the nomadic farmer who practiced “slash and burn agriculture,” in 
addition to hunter-gatherer, composed the striking marks of the “hill people” 
in traditional Southeast Asia. Most minority highlanders did not share the 
dominant lowland society’s values and cultures. Additionally, most majority 
lowlanders often considered the peoples of the highland as savage, barbarian, 
primitive, and uncivilized groups. Such stereotyping suggests that the split 
of upland-lowland is not merely a geographical separation, but—this is the 
most important thing—socio-cultural division. The people of the lowland 
who controlled the governments also did not involve the uplanders in their 
decision-making process and other governmental-political issues. As a result, 
the highlanders became “out-groups,” albeit they played a variety of significant 
roles across the regions of Southeast Asia such as a source of slaves, trade of 
forest products, and magical power. 
Unlike the mainland of traditional Southeast Asia in which its inhabitants were 
divided into upland and lowland dwellers, the real division in the maritime 
regions (such as Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, East 
Timor, among others) was, to borrow Osborne’s phrase, “those who followed 
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a pattern of life related to a permanent base” (e.g. for fishing, trading, and 
farming) and those who pursued “a nomadic life combining hunting and 
slash and burn agriculture.” Whereas in the mainland the nomadic farmer 
was highlanders, that was not the case in areas of the maritime. Apart from the 
details of differences between the mainland/inland and the coastal areas, it is 
common to acknowledge that the mainland was marked by agrarian societies 
while the maritime areas were typified by trading and fishing-based economic 
systems (see also SarDesai 1997). 
It is significant to note that there were no massive state-based societies in 
the region until the arrival of Indian Buddhist priests and Hindu Brahmins, 
which later drove the establishment and transformation of local small states 
to, a sort of “Indic” courts/states across the Southeast Asia’s interior and 
coastal areas. The word “state” highlighted here, it should be noted, is not in 
the sense of modern-nation states, but rather in the term of old-fashioned 
state/government that was characterized by (1) no clear physical boundary 
since it was not a territorial state (as a result, rulers fought and controlled 
over followers not territory); (2) lack of bureaucracy, and indeed there was no 
bureaucrat in the sense of today’s modern-state; (3) patrimonialism in which 
the relationship between the rulers and the ruled was not built based upon 
professional ties but “patron-client” and personal connection with a ruler; 
(4) lack of government structure so that no bureaucratic continuity; (5) no 
standing army; and (6) no mechanism or rule of succession, so that the process 
of transformation of power could be violent. Vietnam was the only country 
in Southeast Asia’s early history that had a sort of “modern” government 
typified by bureaucracy, structures of governments (from central to village 
level), education, professionalism, and a written code as the law. While in 
the “Indic” states (in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, or Java) the officialdom 
was a quasi-hereditary affair, in Vietnamese state bureaucracy was open to all 
citizens who could meet the tests of scholarship. Vietnam’s “uniqueness” can 
be understood, in part because it was the only region in Southeast Asia that 
was “Sinicized” rather than “Indianized” (see Osborn 2000: 35-41).       
Furthermore, the legacy of those “Indic” states in Southeast Asia’s classical 
history can be traced back to the foundation of a number of great classical 
kingdoms scattered from Angkor of Cambodia to Tarumanegara of West Java, 
from Champa to Kutai of Kalimantan.2 Perhaps only Sulawesi and Maluku 
2 Examples of these early “Indic” empires stretching from early centuries AD to 13th 
and 14th centuries included Angkor of Cambodia, Pagan of Burma, Champa (in Southern 
Vietnam), Srivijaya of Sumatra (its center is believed in today’s Palembang), Gangga Neg-
ara (located in today’s Perak, Malaysia), Langkasuka (located in the Malay Peninsula), Pan 
Pan (situated in modern Kelantan or Terengganu, Malaysia), Salakanagara (sited in today’s 
Pandegelang of West Java), Tarumanegara (its power scattered from modern Banten, Bogor, 
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had not been influenced by Hinduism-Buddhism. There are no temples 
and other Indian artifacts so far in both eastern regions of Indonesia. Apart 
from Sulawesi and Maluku, most, if not all, the greatly classical kingdoms 
in Southeast Asia were associated with Buddhism (especially Mahayana 
Buddhism), Hinduism, or both (and in some cases mixed with indigenous 
beliefs). Effected by Southeast Asia’s features and physical environments, these 
classical empires can also be characterized into two main streams: land-based 
states centering agricultural systems and agrarian societies, and maritime-
based empires focusing on trading or a sort of “mercantile state.” While 
Angkor of Cambodia was one of the mightiest examples of the land-based 
empires, Srivijaya of Sumatra was the main powerful maritime-based kingdom 
in Southeast Asia’s classical stage that built its enormous power based on the 
networks of international trade and China’s sponsorship (Tan 2009).   
With the exception of Vietnam, which was deeply-rooted and influenced by 
Chinese-Confucian traditions and politics; thereby extensively differed from 
other territories of Southeast Asia in terms of state organization, as well as 
the Philippines (and perhaps Brunei?), which was never touched by Indian 
cultures, Southeast Asia’s regions in the classical era deeply experienced a 
process of what so-called “Indianization.” Indeed, there has been a debate to 
how Indian cultures and politics come to play its part in the early stages of 
Southeast Asian history and about the degree of its significance. Such debate 
can be understood in part because there was never any major or waves of 
huge migration of people from India to Southeast Asia. Instead, only a limited 
number of people, some of them were Brahmins (Hindu priests), Buddhist 
monks, scholars, and traders searching for routes,3 did travel to Southeast 
Asian regions that were famous as the lands or islands of gold. Once the Indian 
priests-scholars landed and reached the small-scale “states” just appeared in 
the region, they found that their religions—Hinduism and Buddhism—proved 
attractive to the local rulers and their inhabitants (see e.g. Lockard 2009). 
Some scholars have argued that a primary reason of the attractiveness toward 
Indian cultural ideas attached in Buddhism and Hinduism partly because 
these religions fitted perfectly with the local religious beliefs and worldviews 
existing in (some) areas of Southeast Asia. To put it differently, the Indian 
and Jakarta), Kutai Martadipura (in East Kalimantan. Its founder, Kudungga, was a Buddhist 
from the royal family of Champa court), Kalingga (located in today’s Keling of Jepara, and its 
popular king, Ratu Shima, has been called “the classical Srikandi of Javanese society”), and 
Mataram Kuno in Central Java (either related to Wangsa Sanjaya or Wangsa Syailendra which 
were the actors of the formation of Central Java’s great temples: Borobudur, Prambanan/Lara 
Jonggrang, and Kalasan). 
3 The traders travelled to the east from India because of a decision made by the Ro-
man Emperor Vespasian who banned the export of gold to India. 
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cultures, traditions, and knowledge were absorbed by the local rulers and 
populations, and were joined to their existing cultural patterns. Local spiritual-
cultural concepts of the cosmic duality, for instance, resembled those of Indian 
“dewa-dewi” (lit. god-goddess). Local beliefs toward “sacred mountains,” 
along with its guardian spirits, as a source of the balance of universe (see e.g. 
Geertz 1976; Beaty 1999) also nicely fitted Hindu-Buddhist idea of Mount 
Meru (also called “Sumeru” meaning the “Great Meru”), a sacred mountain in 
Hindu-Buddhist cosmology (as well as in Jain mythology). For local believers 
in Java, the Mount Meru is considered to be the center of all the physical, 
metaphysical, and spiritual universes. For Indian Hindus, it is believed that 
the Mt. Meru is to be the adobe of Brahma (the Hindu god of creation) and 
other gods (devas). As well, Indian veneration of the lingam, an image in stone 
of the Hindu god Shiva’s phallus and so symbolizing both divine and earthly 
generative powers, is believed to have fitted well with a similar veneration in 
Southeast Asia of erect stones as fertility symbols (cf. Schrieke 1957). 
Another reason of why Buddhism and Hinduism were eye-catching local 
rulers and their subjects was the “custodians of knowledge” Hindu Brahmins 
and Buddhist monks brought and offered to them. Nothing to do with 
religious concepts, these “custodians of knowledge” that the Brahmins and 
monks carried out during early phases of Southeast Asian history related to 
those of astronomy and astrology, of architecture, and of statecraft. In the 
eyes of local rulers, all these things were very useful to be used as a means of 
governing societies, of crafting a temple, court and building, of expecting a 
major astronomical event, etc., along the way of religious symbolism. Local 
histories and oral traditions scattered from Cambodia to Sunda telling the 
meeting and relationships between Brahmins and monks with local rulers 
confirmed the influence of these Indian priests to local kings.  
However it is central to notice that whatever the significance of imported Indian 
knowledge and cultures and their meeting with the existing local religious 
beliefs, cultural patterns, and worldviews, there were some vital aspects of 
Southeast Asian life that never took roots within Indian cultures. In addition, 
in some cases, a number of fundamental Indian religious systems and cultures 
were never adopted by Southeast Asian Hindus such as the strict caste system 
(i.e. brahma, ksatria, waisya, sudra, and paria). As well, while in India temples 
function as a congregational life, Southeast Asia’s temples were dedicated 
to courts and kings. Although Indian religions, art forms, and systems of 
government had been at the center of Southeast Asian life and cultures, these 
“cultural endowments” had been localized in accordance with “local tastes.” 
In brief, Southeast Asians, indeed, borrowed and absorbed Indian religious 
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beliefs and knowledge but they also adapted these cultural gifts in accordance 
with local cultures and traditions. This is to say that Southeast Asians were 
neither “active givers” nor “passive recipients.” The process of “Indianization” 
hence should be viewed as neither Southeast Asian total acceptance of Indian 
cultural values nor the complete transformation of Southeast Asian cultural 
and political features into Indian nature.  In fact, there were a number of 
cultural patterns that still unique Southeast Asia such as, among others, gender 
relationships, female peasants, and wet-rice cultivation techniques. 
THE AGE OF COMMERCE AND THE ADVENT OF ISLAM
The glory of Hinduism/Mahayana Buddhism-based classical empires 
had come to an end sometime in the 14/15th century after the downfall of 
Cambodia’s Angkor and Sumatra’s Sriwijaya. The Angkor was replaced by 
powerful Thai peoples while Sriwijaya was transformed into a new dominant 
Islamic sultanate of Malacca, which later sponsored “Islamization” to Malay 
regions, Brunei and Borneo, and eastern Indonesia such as Sulawesi (e.g. the 
Kingdom of Gowa) and North Maluku (Sultanates of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, 
and Jailolo). The collapse of the great kingdoms of Angkor and Sriwijaya had 
been followed by the rise of the new era so-called the “Age of Commerce” 
that marked Southeast Asia’s pre-European colonial history, as well as the end 
of Southeast Asia’s classical era. This particular phase was very dynamics in 
terms of cultural and commercial flow since there were various social agents 
and peoples in the region coming from different part of the world.  
The driving forces of this “Age of Commerce” included, but not limited to, 
first, spices which were far more expensive than gold that had been at the 
core of foreigners travelling to Southeast Asia in the “classical” period; second, 
military or political expedition of China-Mongol from the Yuan Dynasty. 
Sometimes in the 1289s, the emperor Kublai Khan (r. 1260–1294) sent 
some 20.000 armies to Java to defeat the King Kertanegara of Singasari in 
East Java and forced it to be a tributary state; and third—and this is the most 
remarkable one—the contact establishment between the Ming Dynasty and 
Southeast Asia regions. Born in 1370, Cheng Ho (Zeng He), it was believed 
to be a Hui Muslim, was the main legendary figure of this contact who led 
huge expeditions to the coastal areas of Southeast Asia since the early fifteenth 
century. 
The Ming Shi (“the History of Ming Dynasty”) recorded that Cheng Ho’s fleet 
was involved 62 big ships and 225 junk (boats) along with 27.550 marines, 
astronomers, politicians, map makers, doctors, traditional healers, preachers, 
ethnographers, etc. (Tan 2009; Nio 1952). From 1405 to 1433, Cheng Ho had 
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conducted the expedition for seven times4 and visited more than thirty seven 
countries: from Indonesian seaports, notably Palembang, Banten, Cirebon, 
Semarang, Gresik, and Surabaya to Ceylon, Kocin, Kalikut, Ormuz, Jeddah, 
Magadisco and Malindi, from Campa to India, from Persian Gulf to Red Sea 
and the coast of Kenya. Cheng Ho’s expeditions were not only for the economic 
and political purposes, but cultural and religious concerns as well.
As a result of the influx of peoples and merchandise from various parts of 
the world, Southeast Asia from fourteenth to sixteenth century, just about the 
coming of European colonials, had been the world’s most prosperous trading 
centers. Witnesses and records of early travelers who transited to Southeast 
Asia’s coastal areas in the 14th to 16th centuries such as Marco Polo, Ibnu Battuta, 
Ma Huan, Loedewicks, de Houtman, to name a few, can be used as evidence of 
the dynamics and advancement of Southeast Asia throughout those centuries. 
Accordingly claims have been made by some specialists of Southeast Asia 
that the period between the 13th and 16th century was a stagnant/static era 
separated from the glorious classical “Golden Age” resulted in the mightiest 
cultural monuments and the heroic colonialism beginning in the late sixteenth 
century need to be reevaluated. 
The emergence of the “Age of Commerce” was indicated by a number of 
fundamental features: (1) the growth of urban cities (it is said the increase was 
three times much bigger that European cities); (2) the plurality of ethnicity 
and religion; (3) the growth of personal wealth (Malay/Indonesian: “orang 
kaya”) that marked the emergence of a new class of wealthy people (indicated 
by the ownership of merchant fleets and ships); and (4) contractual package 
of government distinctive from the “old” fashioned raja-centric states. Here, 
the appearance of a new class of rich people and merchant groups had been 
able to change the nature of politics and state government as well as the 
patterns of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. While in the “old” 
states the status of “elite people” was only determined by hereditary system, 
i.e. only those inherited the blood of kings, princes, courters, or Brahmins 
(Indonesian: “darah biru”) who were able to reach the elite class, during the 
“Age of Commerce,” the new class of rich people and merchant groups could 
4 The first expedition (1405-07) was from Nanjing to Calicut, Champa, Java, Srivi-
jaya, Sumatra, and Ceylon; The second expedition (1407-09) was a voyage to India and to in-
stall the new king of Calicut; The 3rd expedition (1409-11) was to Champa, Temasek, Malaka, 
Sumatra (Samudra and Tamiang), and Ceylon; The fourth one was (1413-15) was a voyage to 
Champa, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, Maldives, Ceylon, India, and Hormuz; The fifth trip (1417-
19)’s destination was Champa, Java, Palembang, Aden, Mogadishu, Brawa, and Malindi on 
the west coast of Africa; The sixth voyage (1421-22) was to Africa and all over the world 
including America (Menzies 2003); and the seventh expedition (1431-33) was to southern 
Vietnam, Surabaya, Palembang, Malaka, Samudra, Ceylon, Calicut, Africa, and Jeddah (see 
e.g. Widodo 2003)   
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achieve such status and negotiated or bargained power/authority with local 
rulers. In some cases, many princes’ daughters were also married to these 
wealthy merchants, a tradition that was alien in the time of “old” states.   
Furthermore, the transition from Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism-
based states to the new “Age of Commerce” had been marked by a massive 
conversion to Theravada Buddhism (especially in the mainland of Burma, 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and southern Vietnam) and Islam (esp. in the 
Malay Peninsula, Brunei, Sumatra, and northern coast of Java). Such rapid 
collapse of Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism was partly because these 
religions were (1) lack of deep social roots, and (2) king-centric religions. As 
a result when the kings and courts collapsed their religions disappeared. It 
happened in the mainland of Southeast Asia like Burma: the real spread of 
Theravada Buddhism since the 13th centuries was because its kings embraced 
this new form of Buddhism and built temples around their kingdoms.
This is to say that the spread of Theravada Buddhism from Sri Lanka to Burma 
was by courts, not trade or conquests. Apart from the role of princes and 
empires in the proliferation of the Theravada, this new “reformed Buddhism” 
differed significantly from the “old” Mahayana in term of the principles of 
religious knowledge, doctrines, and cultures that might be contributed to 
the development of this new Theravada Buddhism. In addition, unlike the 
Mahayana which was lack of social roots the Theravada built Sangha, a 
religious establishment surrounded around the kings, through which this 
religion became deeply rooted. The Theravada was also seen to be more 
“democratic” than the Mahayana, and women could become a priest leading 
rituals and religious liturgy. 
Whereas in Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and southern Vietnam had 
undergone the process of top-down “Theravada-ization,” Southeast Asia’s 
coastal regions such as today’s Malaysia, Sumatra, and northern Java had 
converted to Islam through a vehicle of trade, Sufism/mysticism, art performs, 
etc., a sort of “bottom-up” conversion through cultural means of knowledge 
productions. Southeast Asia’s conversion to Islam since the 13th to 17th centuries 
was through multiple channels of religious actors. However, the main carriers 
of Islam in the region were Sufi-mystics and traders coming from China, 
Arab and the Middle East countries, India, Bengali, Persia, etc. Steadily but 
surely this new forces of Muslims were able to transform Southeast Asian 
peoples and established small, but significant Islamic kingdoms centered in 
Demak (Central Java), Giri (East Java), and Cirebon (West Java) (all located in 
northern coast of Java). By the end of 15th and early 16th centuries, these new 
Muslim movements had successfully toppled the last powerful Java-based 
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Hindu-Buddhist kingdom Majapahit. The description and analysis I sketched 
above suggest that the “integrative revolutions” occurred in pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia were primarily due to the waves of religions and civilization.   
WORLDVIEWS, BELIEFS, AND RITUAL PRACTICES 
Before the arrival of the new world religions, to borrow Max Weber’s (1993) 
phrase, especially Islam, Theravada Buddhism, and Christianity, in the 
fifteenth century, Southeast Asian societies practiced a sort of traditional 
religious beliefs and Hinduism (or Hindu-Buddhist traditions as those of 
Singasari and Majapahit kingdoms). As I briefly described in the previous 
paragraphs, Southeast Asia’s traditional and indigenous religious practices 
were characterized by, first, the worship of guardian and ancestral spirits 
(Javanese: danyang or roh mbahu rekso) by offering meals and other things 
(flower, incense, water, etc.) needed for the rituals. Later these ritual practices 
of guardian and ancestral-spirit veneration had been absorbed and practiced 
by local rulers and palace’s elites. Indeed, local kings and its courts sponsored 
these indigenous religious events such as the Javanese and Malay rulers’ 
annual offerings to spirits of the sea (e.g. Nyai Lara Kidul for the spirit of 
South Sea or Dewi Lanjar for that of the North/Java Sea). Not only rulers (or 
“states”) that have practiced such religious festivals, Muslim societies also still 
preserve such rituals like the nyadran traditions in northern coast of Java. The 
Javanese literature expert from the Netherlands Theodore Pigeaud (1962) also 
noted that Majapahit’s successors maintained ritual ceremony of pre-Islamic 
courts, and cultivated an aesthetic and mythical tradition influenced by earlier 
traditions.    
The second characteristic of “indigenous” religion was animism5 (from Latin 
word anima meaning “soul” or “life”). The late American anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz (1976: 5) once noticed that the sort of animism was not only 
common in Java but also in many of the pagan tribes of Malaysia prior to the 
coming of the world religions. However, this tradition, Geertz continued, has 
proved, over the course of the centuries, remarkably able to absorb into “one 
syncretized whole elements from both Hinduism and Islam,” which follow it 
in the fifteenth century. Before the “incursion” of reformed Islamic religion 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Southeast Asia’s Muslims still 
practiced a syncretic form of religious beliefs. As in the case of Java, the village 
religious system commonly consisted of a “balanced integration” of animistic, 
Hinduistic, and Islamic elements, a basic Javanese syncretism which is the 
5 Animism is a philosophical, religious, or spiritual idea that souls or spirits exist not 
only in humans or animals but also in plants, rocks, mountains, rivers, etc. 
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island’s true folk religion. Religious practices of the Javanese abangan resemble 
Cambodia’s Imam San who has claimed to be the keepers of ancient Cham 
rituals, language, and traditions.  Rites of life passage in Tengger, as Hefner 
remarks, are also celebrated in a “syncretic form” combining various elements 
of ancient Javanese traditions.   
Third, another common theme of Southeast Asia’s religious practice prior to 
the advent of the new world religions dealt with the concept of cosmology, 
or more precisely, the worldview of the sacred duality, that is a sort of belief 
(or wisdom) that preserve the significance of the integration of opposing 
entities: land-water, male-female, sea-mountain, earth-sky, micro-macro 
cosmos, and so forth to keep the harmony of social order and cosmos. Indeed, 
preservation of “cosmos balance” such as the harmony of male-female, dewa-
dewi, gods-goddesses, water-mountain (read, cosmic duality) through certain 
ritual performances had been the central theme of pre-Indic Southeast Asian 
societies. This is to say that creation and recreation of the world through 
harmonious ways had become a primary concern of these traditional peoples. 
The practices of exorcism (a spell), artistic performance, and spirit cultism 
which still survived into the twentieth century are other features of pre-world 
regions Southeast Asia.  
In addition to the above indigenous religious traditions, Southeast Asia 
prior to the entrance of the new world religions was colored by Hinduism. 
The historian of Southeast Asia Oliver Wolters (1993) said that the dominant 
impulse in Hindu religious beliefs was a “devotional” and personalized one 
(bhakti), organized around popular cults in honor of Shiva and Vishnu. 
No doubt, Hinduism (and Mahayana Buddhism-Hinduism) had been at 
the core of classical Southeast Asian traditions. Classical empires such as 
Gangga Negara, Langkasuka, and Pan Pan (all located in modern Malaysia), 
Salakanagara, Tarumanegara (sited in today’s West Java), Kutai Martadipura 
(East Kalimantan), Kalingga (Jepara), as well as the great Singasari and 
Majapahit had been strongly influenced by Hinduism. The term “Indianization” 
of Southeast Asia as Wolters once used it referred to the influence of Indian 
Hindu, and therefore religious or cultural rather than political conceptions that 
brought ancient and persisting indigenous beliefs into sharper focus. In other 
words “Indianization” of Southeast Asia took roots in the forms of culture, art, 
language, scholarship, and above all, religion. Historical records, epigraphs, 
writings, archeological sites, classical monuments, etc. all confirmed Hinduism 
(or Hindu-Buddhism)-driven Southeast Asia’s great cultural achievements. 
Unfortunately, unlike in India, where much of the non-Islamic infrastructure 
survived the Muslim conquests, Southeast Asia’s temples and monasteries of 
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Hindu-Buddhist worship as well as historical sites (epigraphs and learning 
centers included) experienced a near-total collapse in the centuries following 
local rulers’ conversion to Islam. Hefner (2009: 14) noted that before the 
Islamization of its courts took place in the 15th and 16th centuries, Java’s 
kingdoms had some two hundred centers of Hindu-Buddhist monasticism 
and learning, none of which survived into the modern era except a small 
Hindu Javanese enclave of East Java’s Tengger! In the centuries following the 
fall of the last “Siwa-Buda” kingdom of Majapahit, Java’s Hindu-Buddhist 
priestly communities and elements of Indic heritage slowly disappeared 
except in some isolated areas of the eastern salient and Tengger (cf. Hefner 
1989). Again, this historical evidence shows the fact of “raja-centric” religious 
traditions so that when the courts collapsed, peoples would follow new rulers’ 
religions. 
Although the role of courts in the process of the spread of religion (Islam 
included) was significant, it does not mean to diminish the contribution of 
other agents. As I will describe below, besides priyayi elites of the court, the 
role of kiai, haji, habib, sayid, dukun, pastor or priest (e.g. Kiai Sadrach), and 
other non-courtly local leaders as a transmitter of knowledge, religiosity, and 
cultures was very significant. This phenomenon did not only happen in Java 
or Indonesia, but all-across Southeast Asian regions. In the Philippines, for 
instance, the role of pandita or guru in the transmission of knowledge and 
learning process was also very central (see e.g. McKenna 1998).  Hefner (2009: 
11) also noted that the role of religious experts like dukuns, bomohs (Malay), 
and shamans scattered across the Southeast Asia regions before their position 
had been taken place by religious teachers and ulama.   
MODERNITY AND THE RISE OF ISLAMIC REFORMISM
Furthermore, it is central to acknowledge that although since the 14th or the 15th 
century parts of Southeast Asia had already begun to be Islamized, especially 
in the areas of mercantile ports, it was only in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries that the process of Islamization and the creation of Islamic public 
culture took its deep roots and experienced a vast impact through, among 
other things, the development of broad-based institutions for intermediate 
and advanced education in the Islamic sciences, including jurisprudence 
and Islamic canon. This is also the case in South Asia. As Muhammad 
Qasim Zaman, a professor of Near Eastern Studies and Religion at Princeton 
University, has argued in his recent book Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical 
Age, the establishment of the Muhamamdan Anglo-Oriental College, founded 
by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) in 1875 in the north Indian town of Aligarh, 
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as well as the Darul Ulum of Deoband in 1866, both became a primary channel 
for the process of Islamization and the shape of South Asia’s Islamic public 
culture (Zaman 2012: 4-6). 
This analysis, however, does not suggest that there was no Islamic public 
culture in Southeast Asia prior to the 19th and 20th centuries. Indeed Islamic 
public culture had existed before these centuries, but it was produced and 
reproduced by or through sultans or kings-sponsored religious rituals, and 
not institutionalized religious schooling. As well, although madrasas-based 
Islamic education began to take place in the late 18th and 19th century, it does not 
mean that there was no Islamic learning in the region. In the Malay Peninsula, 
for instance, the earliest form of Islamic education since the arrival of Islam in 
the region was Qur’anic recitation, held in mosques, prayer houses (Javanese: 
langgar), or in the homes of learned Muslims (Hefner 2009: 112). Prior to the 
“invention” of modern schools, the introduction and dissemination of Islamic 
knowledge were conducted in, particularly in Java, the prayers houses or in 
the homes of Sufi-mystics and dukun (or shaman, a traditional healer), a sort 
of Egypt’s syaikh ummi, an uneducated religious teacher who claimed to attain 
his Islamic knowledge from visions of the Prophet and the depths of his heart, 
and not from the reading of Islamic texts (see Hefner 2009: 11). 
As other regions of Southeast Asia, Java in the nineteenth century also 
underwent an enormous change that contributed to the development of Islam. 
Java’s rapid change, more specifically, was triggered and caused by the deadly 
Java War from 1825 to 1830 and the massive famine that hit Central Java in the 
19th century. Such poverty and landlessness were also widespread in East Java 
and Madura during that period. This tragic event had caused tens of thousands 
of people died, causing the drop dramatically of Java’s population, while others 
migrated and fled to East Java. The Dutch administration itself also encouraged 
the migration for coffee cultivation purposes (Hefner 1989: 242). Accordingly 
it is understandable why much of the labor required for coffee agriculture in 
the Tengger highlands and other places of the eastern salient, as Hefner noted 
(ibid: 33) was provided by Central Javanese and Madurese immigrants. That 
coffee cultivation, a product of the Dutch-imposed cultuurstelsel or cultivation 
system whose architect of which was the Governor-General van den Bosch, 
was triggered by the bankruptcy and economic/financial crises of the VOC 
(the Dutch East India Company) at the end of the 18th century after nearly two 
centuries in the Indonesian archipelago without significant outcomes in terms 
of economic benefits. In particular, the Prince Diponegoro-led five-year Java 
War (1825-1830) had caused a major devastation.6 
6 Triggered by such lost money and economic crises, van den Bosch (1780-1844) 
proposed to King Willem I (1813-40) to extract agricultural products such as indigo, sugar, 
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A century-long movement of migration from Central Java and later from the 
island of Madura to the areas of East Java, including those of Tengger, a bit 
by bit had colored and transformed this eastern salient area’s local cultures 
and traditions as well as had changed its society’s economy. The Madurese, 
originally came as migrant workers on Dutch-owned lands, have set two 
distinct social classes: first is a small group of wealthy entrepreneurs who 
acted as labor managers and coffee agents for the Chinese and Dutch, and 
second is a much larger class of landless laborers who were brought by the 
entrepreneurs to work the land, known as santri in the sense of both “workers” 
and “orthodox” Muslims. The influx of Muslim migrants had pushed back the 
followers of Buda religion into the interior of rural villages and mountains 
(e.g. Hindu Tenggerese). Nonetheless the Islamic population continued to 
grow significantly in the 19th century “as a result of government policy giving 
land titles to both the coffee lords and their previously landless dependents” 
(Hefner 1987a: 59-60). 
One of the key factors underlying cultuurstelsel output, according to the 
historian M.C. Ricklefs (2007), was the investment of Javanese labor, not land, 
into agricultural production for the government. It is central to remember that 
since the cultuurstelsel needs the involvement of labor to make it successful 
the idea of how to mobilize labor became crucial. In an attempt to achieve this 
goal, the Dutch collaborated with the Javanese elites: priyayi. In a stratified 
society with feudal political system like Java, the role of priyayi who held 
“traditional” authority at the time was central in organizing Javanese labors 
and peasants to grow coffee, sugar, indigo, tea, pepper, tobacco, cinnamon, etc. 
Hence it is understandable that the contribution of priyayi was fundamental 
to the entire system of cultuurstelsel. During the period of cultuurstelsel there 
were two contrasting views, on one hand, many of the priyayi elite and village 
landowners prospered. Officials also received good salaries, percentages on 
crops compulsorily produced by the peasants under their authority. 
The system, furthermore, stimulated the rise of a nascent middle class society 
who was able to build better houses, to advance their businesses, to educate 
their children, to go to Mecca to do hajj, and to some degree, to embrace 
Islamic reform movements. They often had businesses and religious links 
with the Arab communities found especially in the coastal towns and cities of 
Java (known: kampong Arab). However, on the other hand, as a result of the 
cultuurstelsel, many peasants suffered and died due to devastating famines and 
and above all, coffee from Java in a volume and at a price that would be enable the Netherlands 
to become one of the world’s greatest suppliers of those tropical products and, by definitions, 
brought the lost money back. And this task would be successful, van den Bosch suggested, in 
a way that would benefit the Javanese themselves (Ricklefs 2007: 12-3). 
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outbreaks of epidemics (c. 1846-50).  Thus, to sum up, in the mid-nineteenth 
century Javanese society had polarized into three social groups: the priyayi elite 
(bupati and government officials included), a promising Muslim bourgeoisie, 
and peasants. These social groups are not only a matter of class differences, 
but they also differed in fundamental ways: cultural and religious orientation, 
aspirations, and the relationships to the dominant colonial power (Ricklefs 
2007: 12-29).  
Furthermore, the introduction of coffee in East Java, particularly in the 
region of “Besuki” had not only changed “the village’s ethnic and religious 
composition but had also introduced a new mode of production in which 
the Buda population was a distinct disadvantage” (Hefner 1987: 60). In other 
words, Muslim immigration and coffee cultivation—and sugar in areas of 
Pasuruan—not only changed the economy of the mountain terrain and rural 
villages but brought about the first stage of its Islamization as well. As a result 
of the economic advances and the growth of Muslim population, by the mid-
nineteenth century, most of Hindu Tenggerese had been pushed further up 
into the highlands or assimilated into the economically dominant immigrant 
Muslim population (Hefner 1989, 1987b) so did local people of other regions 
outside Tengger. As well, due to this economic development, these Muslim 
communities were able to build religious institutions: schools (pesantren), 
mosques, and prayer houses (mushalla or langgar) which did not exist in the 
areas of Tengger prior to the final quarter of the nineteenth century or early 
20th century. These Islamic institutions, on one hand, had enormously played 
major contributions to the development of Islam and the decline of “Hindu-
Buda” religion on the other. 
Indeed, seen from Islamic perspective, the nineteenth century of Java and 
Southeast Asia in general had been marked by a number of crucial changes: 
(1) the increase of the number of Muslims who took pilgrimage to the Holy 
Land as an impact of the opening of Suez Canal; (2) the spread of Islamic 
boarding schools (Javanese: pesantren) across Southeast Asia’s regions, 
particularly Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula; (3) the growth of Sufi tarekat 
brotherhoods, and (4) the growing of orthodox, fundamentalist, and reformist 
Muslims. All these factors had contributed to the development of reformed 
Islam, the decline of “traditional” religions (including Hinduism), the tensions 
among Muslims sub-groupings (e.g. traditionalists versus reformists, Sufi-
mystics vis a vis legal-minded Muslims, among others), and the emergence 
of anti-colonial movements that challenged colonial authority. No doubt haji 
and kiai in the nineteenth centuries had enormously played significant role 
not only as a charismatic religious figure directing religious ceremonies and 
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Islamization processes but also a political leader taking the lead socio-political 
movements against the Dutch and the colonial-backed local aristocrats as in 
the cases of the Banten War in 1888 and the resistance of Kiai Ahmad Rifa’i, 
along with his Rifa’iyah in Central Java (Kartodirdjo 1973, Djamil 2001). 
Due to the influx of a sort of purified Islam, Ricklefs (2007: 252-3) characterizes 
the nineteenth century Java as the era of the rise of Islamic reform and 
revivalism. He argued that Islamic reformist notions evidently began to 
have an influence in Java in the 1850s, about half a century after “Islamic 
reformation” took place in Minangkabau of Sumatra. Arab communities of 
Java’s pasisir (coastal areas) towns seemed to have a leading role as carriers and 
transmitters of Islamic reform ideas. One of the Arab leaders was Hadharami 
Sayid Uthman bin Aqil bin Yahya al-Alawi (d. 1913), who became a leading 
voice for reformist Islam. His publications of more than 100 titles remained 
influential among Java’s Arabs and reformist Muslims. Likewise the increasing 
numbers of haji before and after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the 
growing numbers of pesantren, and the spread of printing media, Ricklefs has 
noted, had played a major role in transmitting and spreading ideas of purified 
and reformed Islam (cf. Hefner 2009). The forms of reform Islam and reformist 
Muslims themselves varied ranging from Puritanism (purification-oriented 
Islam), anti-Sufism faction, shari’ah-minded groups, shari’ah-based Sufism, 
and reformed traditionalists, to name but a few. Although they might differ 
from one to another in their focus and objective, however, the basic ideas of 
the Muslim reformists mostly the same, namely the eagerness to make Islam 
more pristine as it was performed by the salafus-salih (lit. the “pious forebears”, 
namely the early generations of Muslims) by avoiding non-Islamic aspects of 
local traditions, cultures, and practices. Accordingly these reformist Muslims, 
sometimes called the “Salafis”, would never tolerate religious practices and 
communities that opposed their strict Islamic conviction and beliefs. As a 
result of the purification movement, the “syncretic Muslims” such as Java’s 
abangan (nominal Muslims) or Cambodia’s Imam San had become one of 
the main targets of the reformists’ Islamization and proselytization (da’wa) 
movement.
It is worth noting that in contemporary parlance the term Salafi has come to 
acquire many different connotations. It has been used to refer to some groups 
who consider it obligatory to take up arms against all those—Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike—who are deemed to challenge or contravene the dictates 
of the Islamic foundational texts—the Qur’an and the normative example 
of the Prophet Muhammad (the Sunna). The term also refers to a politically 
quietist trend, typified by the Saudi religious establishment, that rejects all 
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beliefs and practices seen as compromising the ones of God (tawhid) while 
leaving politics largely to the ruling elite. The term Salafi, moreover, is also 
used for, and by, those who reject the authority of the medieval schools of law 
and insist on an unmediated access to the foundational texts as the source 
of all norms. The common use of the term Salafi or Salafism, however, is, in 
Zaman’s phrase, “to denote an approach to Islam that was anchored in the 
foundational texts and in the example of the “pious forbears” as contrasted 
with understandings of Islam “distorted” by centuries of legal, theological, and 
mystical debates, self-serving ulama, and despotic rulers” (Zaman 2012: 6-7). 
       Equally important, apart from pros and cons of the rise of the Salafis or the 
reformists, they played a central role in the establishment of Islamic education 
institutions, particularly modern-type madrasas, for intermediate and 
advanced Islamic learning through which became one of the main channel of 
the process of Islamization throughout the regions of Southeast Asia. As some 
historians have noted these Islamic schools began to emerge in substantial 
numbers only toward the end of the 18th and became widespread in Southeast 
Asia, particularly Java, Sumatra, Southern Thailand, and the Malay Peninsula, 
only in the final decades of the 19th century. Only in the Southern Philippines, 
Cambodia, and Sulawesi did the madrasas appear in the first half of the 20th 
century (see e.g. Hefner 2009: 16-7). These Islamic schools had been founded 
by kiais and ulama upon their return from their studies in the Middle East and 
Arab countries, especially the “Harramain” (Mecca and Medina). 
The opening of Suez Canal in 1869 and steamship technology had made 
Southeast Asian Muslims more easily reaching Arabia. As a result, by 1885, 
Southeast Asian Muslims in the Arab lands composed the single largest 
community in Mecca and Medina, and by 1927, pilgrims from the British 
Malaya and the Dutch Indies comprised 42% of the foreign total pilgrims (see 
e.g. Laffan 2007, 2011). The effect of heightened travel to the Middle East, 
particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, toward the Southeast Asia’s Islamic 
reformation, schooling, and social movement during the nineteenth century 
was obvious. Wahhabism and Salafism had been the one of the primary driving 
forces of the reformist movements. In Thailand, for instance, reformist Islam 
was also rooted in the 19th Islamic reformism of the Salafi movement inspired 
by Egypt’s Muhammad Abduh. This movement was brought by Ahmad Wahab, 
who established Ansor al-Sunah, Thailand’s first reformist organization. Thus, 
it is clear that in Southeast Asia, the nineteenth century was a “tipping point” 
for a massive Islamic education and the process of Islamization as a whole. 
The noted historian of Java Merle Ricklefs said that prior to the growing 
emergence of these Islamic reform movements in the 19th century, in Java 
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actually there had already been significant numbers of professionally religious 
peoples: mosque officials, religious teachers, guardians of holy sites, students of 
pesantrens, among others who were known collectively as kaum (“the religious 
folk”) or putihan (“the white people”) since the 1840s. On the northern 
coast of Java, these particular groups sometimes were called santri while the 
Dutch called them geestelijken: clericals, religious. There is no clear evidence 
whether such groups formed a force for Islamic puritanism, fundamentalism, 
or revivalism. However there are some similarities among those groups in 
the way they perceived the Javanese abangan as ignorant, backward, impure, 
and impious. Some puritan groups also sometimes called themselves kaum 
putihan. At the same time, the abangan (sometimes called abritan) responded 
negatively to the pressures for a more purified form of religious life advocated 
by the putihan. It is interesting that the tensions between the abangan and the 
putihan was not unique phenomena of Javanese religious society but also other 
parts of Southeast Asia such as the case of Imam San and Chvea in Cambodia 
or the community of “Islam Tua” and “Islam Muda” in the islands of Sulawesi’s 
Sangihe-Talaud.   
While the abangan since the late nineteenth century appeared as the majority 
social category and opposed the putihan’s ideas of “the proper understanding 
of Islam,” a tiny minority of Javanese rejected Islam and became Christians for 
the first time in the Javanese history, led by some extraordinary figures such as 
Kiai Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung, and above all, Kiai Sadrah Surapranata, who 
converted thousands of Javanese peoples to Christianity7 prior to his death in 
1924 and then established the Javanese Christian Churches (Gereja Kristen 
Jawi), a mixture of European-Christian beliefs and Javanese cultures and 
concepts. Another faction of Javanese society was priyayi who enthusiastically 
embraced European learning and life style but still regarded themselves as 
Muslims, not Christians. Not all priyayi were happy with, and pragmatically 
embraced Islam, however, some priyayi rejected Islam altogether and wanted 
to return to the “Buda age” (i.e. an era of Hindu-Buddhism in pre-modern 
Java). For this particular group, the Islamization process of Javanese society was 
viewed as a great historical mistake; accordingly they advocated anti-Islamic 
movements and supported Budi-Buda teachings by tracing back to periods of 
the pre-Islamic Java. The emergence of anti-Islamic Javanese literatures such 
as Babad Kedhiri, Suluk Gatoloco, and Serat Dermogandhul in the 1870s can 
be seen from this point of view.  
7 Today’s Javanese/Indonesian Muslims very often have blamed the Dutch as the 
primary agent of religious conversion of local peoples to Christianity. Ricklefs (2007: 255) ar-
gued that the role of European missionaries in the conversion process was much less import-
ant than that of the Indo-European and indigenous Javanese proselytizers who successfully 
bridged the cultural gaps between Christianity and Javanese culture. 
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The historical facts I depicted above suggest that the process of encounter 
of two or more different cultures on one hand could color and enrich each 
culture and tradition of societies, but on the other hand could cause conflicts 
and tensions. It is understandable because religion functions not only as a 
“social cohesion” as Emile Durkheim (1995) nicely asserted in his classic book 
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, or a “social integration” as Clifford 
Geertz (1976) wrongly concluded in his The Religion of Java, but also serves 
as a vehicle of social conflicts. In the process of encounter, Javanese societies 
were not “passive recipient” so were Muslims and other “outsiders.” They, 
instead, were active and influenced each other. To put it differently, each 
society has contributed in the process of interaction and encounter. This 
“creative tensions” have been well described in several Javanese texts and oral 
traditions: Aji Saka tale, Serat Centhini, and Javanese texts, commonly known 
babads, such as Serat Kandaning Ringgit Purwa, Babad Cerbon, Babad Tanah 
Jawi, and Serat Bental Jemur. Such creative tensions have produced the form 
of “salad” Islam of Javanese societies.
JAVA’S ISLAMIC CONVERSION AND SOUTHEAST ASIA’S 
RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE
As other parts of Southeast Asia, in Java, a critical turning point that marks 
the vitality of Islam—and, by definition, the collapse of Hindu-Buddhist 
influences—also happened in the 19th century. One of the great examples or 
illustrations of such took place in the region of “Besuki” (not a real name) in 
East Java when in 1872 the wealthy Muslim entrepreneur and the grandson 
of a Tengger priest by the name of Haji Muhammad Saleh was elected by the 
villagers to be the village chief (Hefner 1987a: 61; 1989: 244). Although he 
was a Muslim, Hajj Muhammad Saleh was quite moderate and even utilized a 
famous tale of Aji Saka, a Javanese-pluralist cultural symbol that preserves the 
harmony between Islam and Javanese cultures and traditions to reconcile and 
bridge tensions between Muslims and Buda adherents. 
The critical junctures that mark the abrupt decline of “Hindu-Buda” religion 
influence mostly took place in the era of post-Haji Muhammad Saleh in 
the late of nineteenth and the twentieth century. There were several critical 
moments that signified Islamization, conversion processes, and great socio-
cultural changes in this region. The first crucial moment was when the 
annual Karo festival had been replaced with annual village rite led by, not 
a Buda priest, an Islamic modin. The second moment was when the local 
Muslim community established a first mosque (c. 1922) in a former ancestral 
shrine that made the followers of Buda religion shocked. In the village of 
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Wonorejo village, furthermore, the reformist Muslims cut down a tree where 
local people believed as the site of Nyai Po, the guardian spirit of the village. 
The third factor was about in the 1930s when Muhammadiyah reformists 
launched a program of reformed religious education in Besuki and several 
neighboring villages. The fourth was during the Indonesian independence 
struggle, especially when a village leader of a devoted modernist Muslim 
and progressive administrator launched road-building programs, a drinking 
water project, home reconstruction, and religious reforms by banning public 
consumption of alcohol, public dancing (e.g. tayub), and the recitation of Aji 
Saka story (Hefner 1987a: 66; 1989: 246). 
Finally the big wave of conversion to Islam occurred in the aftermath of the 
bloody the New Order-led anti-communist events of 1965-1966 when the 
new regime of Indonesia obliged its peoples to embrace one of the Indonesia’s 
official religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Balinese 
“reformed” Hinduism. At present, Confucianism becomes the state’s official 
religion. Although there was no physical violence in the region due to no 
communist members and organizers had been found in it, the Besuki people 
were scared due to rumors spread throughout the region that persons not 
professing one of the state’s recognized religions could be accused of being 
communist. This moment had been utilized by the village’s Muslim chief to 
offer Buda followers of Besuki in order to identify themselves as Muslim with 
a compensation of protecting the Karo rite tradition. 
While Buda followers of Besuki had been offered to acknowledge Islam, the 
Hindu followers of Tengger preferred to merge to Balinese Hinduism. The 
peak of Islamization and conversion process in Besuki and other part of Java 
and Indonesia was absolutely during the New Order in which through the 
Department of Religious Affairs, the regime had sponsored Islamic dakwah 
movements by building mosques, religious schools, madrasas and other 
religious institutions across the country as well as by sending Islamic preachers 
(da’i, mubaligh) and religious schoolteachers to Indonesian towns and villages. 
These facts have proved that the New Order was not “anti-Islamic” as some 
observers might think. Indeed, the regime pushed back Muslim political 
parties by prohibiting Masyumi and other radical Muslim groups, but the 
New Order greatly sponsored those Islamic dakwah activities.        
The phenomena above have pictured well the lengthy process of Java’s 
Islamization and conversion from local religions—Hindu, Buddha, animism, 
“Javanism,” etc.—to Islam. There were various patterns and dynamics of Java’s 
Islamization, transformation, and conversion processes through period of 
time. At different times Islamization within modern Javanese history has 
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been channeled to very different sociopolitical forces. In the 19th and early 
20th centuries for instance Islamization process went hand in hand with the 
increase of pesantren institutions, religious schools, and economic structures. 
While during the Old Order Islamization was linked to aliran (lit. “streaming”) 
pattern of party mobilization, in the time of the New Order it strongly related 
to educational programs and dakwah movements. 
In addition, the cases illustrated above capture the dynamics of Java’s 
Islamization and lengthy conversion processes from local and “small-scale” 
Javanese religions to the “transnational” and “world” religion, notably Islam. 
This “great conversion” to new world religions, as I noticed in the previous 
paragraphs, had been common view and widespread phenomena in Southeast 
Asia since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and this conversion 
continues nowadays. The term “religious conversion” used in this essay refers 
not only to a religious or theological change, but also to include a shift from a 
particular religious identity within a single religious tradition. Contemporary 
Southeast Asia and Asia, more generally (except Japan or North Korea), has 
been marked by, among others, this later sort of conversion and religious 
resurgence, namely an unprecedented upsurge in religious ritual, association, 
and observance. 
In the once securely Catholic Philippines, the past generation has been 
dramatic conversion to evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity (Howell 2008). 
Vietnam, since the Doi Moi reforms of the late 1980s has also witnessed the 
resurgence of ritual practice (Malarney 2002). The ritualist surge includes not 
just the revival of long-suppressed household rites, but also the expansion of 
public cults such as the Lady of the Realm goddess in southern Vietnam (Taylor 
2004). In the Theravada Buddhist lands of Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, the 
past generation has also witnessed a steady expansion in lay devotion such as 
meditation movements that square off against a regime-backed Buddhism. The 
Theravada movements share a characteristic with Pentecostal and charismatic 
Christians across Southeast Asia, namely the prominence of women in their 
ranks. Over the past generation, Muslim Southeast Asia has also experienced 
a dramatic religious revitalization. Whereas two generations ago, Southeast 
Asia was renowned for the home-grown varieties of Islam, today, Saudi-
inspired Salafiyyah conservatives, Hizbut Tahrir internationalists, India-
based Jamaah Tabligh, and the Middle East-typed Muslim Brothers move 
effortlessly across the region. Although Southeast Asia’s Islamic resurgence 
shows clear global influences, the universalized influences find their meaning 
in “concrete engagement” not in “abstract principles of knowledge and power” 
(Tsing 2005: 67).          
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To some degree, this immense religious change from “traditional” and 
“indigenous” religions to new religious beliefs as well as a shift from established 
world religions to new variants within the same but internationally-linked 
world religions resembles the collapse of small home industries by the 
emergence of transnational corporation (TNC) in the economic world. 
The analyses depicted above suggest that religion is not simply a matter of 
individual belief and personal faith but, at some point, also a social institution 
which—like other institutions—depends upon a particular social and political 
configuration for its reproduction as well as religious agents as the producer 
of religious discourses. Moreover, the historical facts and analyses I sketched 
above suggest that religious conversion—whether in the sense of a change of 
religion or a shift of particular religious identity within a single religious—is 
not simply a matter of individual choice and personal evaluation toward certain 
religion or religious groups but a social problem linked to the construction of 
political institutions under which some meanings would be shared and others 
denied. The political economy of religious culture, hence, ensures this massive 
conversion and transformation process and asserts the nature, existence, and 
function of religion as both belief system and institution in the social-cultural 
field of Southeast Asia.
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